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NOTES
LIABILITY OF A TESTING COMPANY
TO THIRD PARTIES
I. INTRODUCTION
"WE CERTIFY THAT. . . ." Many products bear words similar to
these to assure the consumer that the product he is buying has been tested,
inspected and approved. The problem to be considered in this note is: If
such words are negligently uttered by a testing company, can a consumer
who has no privity of contract with the testing company hold it liable for
any harm that follows? The answer lies in an examination of whether a
testing company owes a duty to consumers when it makes a certification,
and if so, its extent. The extent of duty, as applied to accountants, was
stated by Judge Cardozo in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the
failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive en-
tries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount
for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a
business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt
whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes
to these consequences.'
In the cases to be discussed, there is no privity of contract between the
plaintiff and defendant, thus increasing the difficulty of establishing a duty.2
Moreover, except for the express warranty cases, the tort involved is negli-
gence and the actions are not based either on fraud or statutory liability.
The Restatement of Torts contains a carefully thought out rule with re-
spect to those who negligently supply information for the guidance of others.3
1. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179-80, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931).
2. PROSSER, TORTS § 84, at 497 (2d ed. 1955).
3. § 552 Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others.
One who in the course of his business or profession supplies information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions is subject to liability for harm
caused to them by their reliance upon the information if
(a) he fails to exercise that care and competence in obtaining and communicat-
ing the information which its recipient is justified in expecting, and
(b) the harm is suffered(i) by the person or one of the class of persons for whose guidance the in-
formation was supplied, and
(ii) because of his justifiable reliance upon it in a transaction in which it was
intended to influence his conduct or in a transaction substantially identical
therewith. RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 552 (1938).
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The rule is sound, but it leaves a major problem unanswered-where are
the boundaries of the class of persons to whom a duty of due care is extended
when information is supplied for their guidance?
II. TESTING COMPANIES
Testing companies play an important role in our economy,' certifying a
wide range of products.' Manufacturing concerns utilize independent test-
ing companies for a variety of reasons. Use of a testing company's name
or tag in the manufacturer's advertising is a principal benefit gained from
such testing.6 "The consumer, both in the home and in the factory, de-
mands and expects evidence of product testing."7 Independent laboratories
are used for this purpose because self-certification by a manufacturer is open
to question.8 Approval by a testing company may
take many forms,... testing laboratory's official insignia, printed on the
product ... seal appearing in a corner of a newspaper advertisement
* * . or a label. Whatever it is-and whether or not the consumer
actually stops to read an entire tag or seal-its mere presence on a
product is reassuring and influences the buyer. He feels secure in his
purchase-and the manufacturer knows that the buyer will prefer an
authorized product.9
"Today the manufacturer, by means of newspapers, television and other
media of communication, extols his products in an effort to persuade the
The comment to the section points out that to subject the person supplying the informa-
tion to liability it is not enough that he realize that someone other than the person to
whom he supplied the information might rely on it. The consumer fits into this RESTATE-
MENT section, as testing companies supply information for the guidance of consumers in
their business transactions (their purchases of goods).
4. For instance, when the American Council of Independent Laboratories, Inc. was
founded in 1937, only 18 of the members now listed were charter members. Today the
organization has 79 members. AmERICAN COUNCIL OF INDEPENDENT LABORATORIES, INC.,
DIRECTORY OF AMERICAN COUNCIL OF INDEPENDENT LABORATORIES, INC. VI-VU (1961).
In fact, there are enough testing and standardization organizations in the United States
that a book has been published giving a descriptive inventory of the work of about 350
American organizations involved in standardization activities. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMIERCE,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS, STANDARDIZATION ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
(1960).
5. These companies test such things as abrasives, alcohols, bread, cement, cotton,
enzymes, glass, jewelry, narcotics, paint, rope, soap, starch, tobacco and wool. AMERICAN
COUNCIL OF INDEPENDENT LABORATORIES, INC., op cit. supra note 4, at 85-114.
6. Printer's Ink, Oct. 24, 1958, pp. 56-57.
7. Mandell, Product Testing: Everybody's Doing It, Dun's Rev. and Modem Industry,
April 1958, p. 40.
8. Gregor, Seal of Approval: The Role of Independent Testing Laboratories, Manage-




public to purchase them."'" The unquestioned impact of advertising on the
public, coupled with glowing representations of quality from testing com-
panies has created a high degree of customer reliance.
To maintain this reliance the American Council of Independent Labo-
ratories was formed. This organization, which promotes the professional
integrity of testing companies," seeks to maintain high standards by requir-
ing each member to be in business at least five years and have a good stand-
ing in the business community. 2 Testing companies are keenly aware of
public reaction 3 and because of possible liability suits some have attempted
to limit their liability.'4 Understandably, therefore, some companies are re-
10. Comment, 42 MARQ. L. Rav. 521 (1959).
11. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF INDEPENDENT LABORATORIES, INC., op. cit. supra note 4,
at iii.
12. Newsweek, Feb. 22, 1960, p. 84.
13. One company advertises that, "Quantometer pictures are available, if you wish
to show in your own advertising, some of the Modern Equipment used by your testing
specialists." Chicago Spectro Service Laboratory, Inc., advertising literature. (All adver-
tising literature referred to in this note is on file in the Washington University Law Quar-
terly office and was obtained by request from the various companies.) Another company
states that one of the special services it provides is to perform tests on products so that
manufacturers can base advertising claims on such tests. Foster D. Snell, Inc., advertising
literature (1959). However, one company states that its name may not be used for adver-
tising purposes. Harris Laboratories, Inc., advertising literature. A third company takes
the middle road and states that no report issued by them may be published without their
written permission. United States Testing Co., Inc., adverising literature.
14. The opinions and findings of Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc. represents itsjudgment given with due consideration to the necessary limitations of a practical
operation and in accordance with the objects and purposes as herein set forth.
Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc., however, assumes no responsibility for the effect
of its services, reports, listings, requirements, and labeling or for the observance or
non-observance by the manufacturer of its Standards or requirements upon the rela-
tions between the manufacturer and any other party or parties arising out of the
sale or use of listed products or otherwise. UNDERWRITERS' LABORATORIES, INC.,
TESTING FOR PUBLIC SAFETY 8 (1963).
It should, however, be noted that findings of Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc., in
any case represent only its independent opinion arrived at in accordance with its
aims and purposes. Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc. does not warrant or guarantee
the correctness of this opinion, or that its findings will be recognized or accepted in
any individual case. Final recognition or acceptance rests with the authority having
jurisdiction.
It should be noted also that products Labeled or Listed are not necessarily
equivalent in quality or merit. Id. at 12.
Another type of disclaimer clause is, "Our letters and reports apply only to the sample
tested and are not necessarily indicative of the qualities of apparently identical or similar
products." This statement is printed on the bottom of a letter from United States Test-
ing Company, Inc., to author, Feb. 5, 1963 on file in Washington University Law Quar-
terly office. In slightly larger type, the printed disclaimer continues, "The reports and
letters and the name of the United States Testing Company, Inc., or its seals or insignia,
are not to be used under any circumstances in advertising to the general public."
It is pointed out by Dean Prosser that:
It is quite possible for the parties expressly to agree that the defendant is under
no obligation of care for the benefit of the plaintiff, and shall not be liable for
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luctant to discuss either their methods, insurance coverage or liability."
One type of "seal of approval" that is issued by a magazine means only
that if the consumer finds the product defective, the magazine guarantees
its replacement or a refund of the purchase price."0 This magazine is not a
"testing organization" but merely assures itself that the product is satis-
factory. However, most testing companies do make definite statements
about the products they test,"1 and the question remains whether they
should be responsible for negligent representations regardless of attempts to
disclaim liability.
the consequences of conduct which would otherwise be negligence. There is no
public policy which prevents the parties from contracting as they see fit. PRossR,
TORTS § 55, at 305 (2d ed. 1955).
It was held in one case, C.I.T. Financial Corp. v. Glover, 224 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1955),
that an accounting firm could disclaim liability to third parties for negligence by insert-
ing in each audit report a disclaimer clause. The disclaimer stated the accounting firm
did not feel that it was in its province to pass upon or assume responsibility for the valu-
ation of either collateral or receivables.
However, in another case, Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 204 F. Supp.
821 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), a disclaimer clause was struck down. The city had hired
an engineering firm to draw up plans for a sewer line, and the firm negligently left out
certain test borings from its plans. These plans were submitted to contractors for bids on
the sewer line. Because of the negligence, the costs on the sewer line ran higher than
anticipated by the bidders. Recovery was allowed against the engineering firm by the
contractors regardless of the disclaimer clause in the contract and the lack of privity
between the parties.
One principal reason the court allowed recovery was that the engineering firm could
reasonably foresee that the plans would be relied upon by the bidders in spite of the
disclaimer. The court also stated, "The continued growth and expansion of industry, the
growth of population, the urbanization of society, the growing complexity of business rela-
tions and the growing specialization of business functions all require more and more
reliance in business transactions upon the representations of specialists." Id. at 833.
Some testing companies, however, have made no attempt to limit their liability. Letter
from Foster D. Snell, Inc., to author, Feb. 25, 1963, on file in Washington University
Law Quarterly office.
One reason why most testing companies are anxious to limit their liability may be the
fact that there seems to be no generally available insurance coverage (i.e. service, as
opposed to products, liability insurance) written for testing companies to cover this type
of negligence, or if there is, none of the companies choose to carry it. See letters from
Foster D. Snell, Inc., to author, Feb. 25, 1963, Detroit Testing Laboratory, Inc., to
author, Feb. 20, 1963, National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, to author, Feb. 19,
1963, and Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc., to author, Jan. 10, 1963, on file in Washing-
ton University Law Quarterly office.
15. Sometimes the reason given for refusal is phrased in terms of ethical standards or
confidential relations. See letters from The Parents' Magazine Consumer Service Bureau,
to author, Feb. 20, 1963, and United States Testing Company, Inc., to author, Feb. 5,
1963, on file in Washington University Law Quarterly office.
16. Letter from McCauley, Henry & Brennan, attorneys for Good Housekeeping Maga-
zine, to author, Feb. 14, 1963, on file in Washington University Law Quarterly office.
17. Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that such statements or testing reports are
not insurance against failure. All a test can do is certify the characteristics of the one
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III. TESTNG COMPANY CASES
The leading case concerning the liability of a testing company to third
parties is National Iron & Steel Co. v. Hunt." The defendant, engaged in
the business of inspecting and testing construction and building materials
for more than twenty-five years, was hired by the H. M. Foster Company
to inspect secondhand re-laying rails purchased by Foster, subject to such
inspection.19 Later plaintiff, relying on defendant testing company's certifi-
cation that the rails were first-class in kind and quality, purchased the rails
from Foster; subsequently plaintiff discovered that the rails were not first-
class 0 and was therefore unable to resell them. Plaintiff, thereupon, brought
suit to recover his loss.
Recovery was granted by the intermediate appellate court.21 The Su-
preme Court of Illinois, however, reversed the decision22 and stated, "For
an injury arising from mere negligence, however gross, there must exist
between the party inflicting the injury and the one injured some privity, by
contract or otherwise, by reason of which the former owes some legal duty
to the latter."2 The only duty imposed upon the defendant was owed to
Foster by reason of their contract.
However, the opinion of the intermediate appellate court is worthy of
consideration. While recognizing the fact that there was no privity of con-
tract between the parties, the following exception to the general rule of "no
privity-no duty" was stated:
[T]hat where a person undertakes to do an act or discharge a duty by
which the conduct of another may be properly regulated and governed,
object being tested. Letter from Detroit Testing Laboratory, Inc., to author, Feb. 20,
1963, on file in Washington University Law Quarterly office. But such statements are
considered to be very important by the buying public, and, in fact, as one company states,
"One test is worth more than 1,000 expert opinions." Bowser-Morner Testing Labora-
tories, Inc., advertising literature.
18. 312 Ill. 245, 143 N.E. 833 (1924). This case was first tried before the Superior
Court of Cook County where judgment was given for the defendant. It was appealed
to the appellate court where the case was reversed and remanded, 192 Ill. App. 215
(1915). On retrial in the Superior Court of Cook County judgment was given for the
plaintiff, and it was affirmed in 230 Ill. App. 654 (1923). On certiorari to the Supreme
Court of Illinois, judgment for the plaintiff was reversed, 312 Ill. 245, 143 N.E. 833
(1924).
19. Defendant, in fact, inspected approximately 80% of the re-laying rails sold in
this country.
20. When plaintiff could not make the sale, he hired defendant to inspect the rails
again (since defendant was the recognized expert in this field), on his second inspection,
defendant determined the rails were not first-class.
21. National Iron & Steel Co. v. Hunt, 192 III. App. 215 (1915).
22. National Iron & Steel Co. v. Hunt, 312 Ill. 245, 143 N.E. 833 (1924).
23. Id. at 247, 143 N.E. at 833.
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he is bound to perform it in such a manner that those who are right-
fully led to a course of conduct or action on the faith that the act or
duty will be duly and properly performed shall not suffer loss or injury
by reason of his negligence. 4
The court went on to point out that "the very purpose of such certificates
when once issued would be to expedite sales by relieving dealers of the
necessity of other inspection or tests."2 The reasoning illustrates that "in
these highly specialized times" the public should have a right to rely on the
results of a tester's inspection and his duty to exercise due care should ex-
tend beyond the bounds of privity. 8
These contrasting opinions clearly reveal the problem concerning the
extent of duty. The upper court's decision expresses the generally accepted
judicial attitude toward testing company liability.27 Recognizing that a
duty of due care is owed by each person to any member of the public who
may be injured by his actions, the court still held that some plaintiffs are too
remote to fall within this duty. However, it should be pointed out that the
class which might have been injured by the certification was limited in this
case to the subsequent buyers of the rails. The absence of privity was used
as a factor in determining remoteness.
This remoteness or foreseeability reasoning appeared in an earlier testing
case.2" An independent grain inspector2" negligently certified grain which
was later purchased by the plaintiff. The injured plaintiff was denied
recovery because there was no privity. The court reasoned that the in-
spector's liability could not be based on negligence alone and that in the
absence of contract, no duty extended to persons as remote to the transac-
tion as the plaintiff.
This rule, however, has not commanded universal acceptance; Du Rite
Laundry, Inc. v. Washington Elec. Co. is illustrative.3" The defendant sold
24. National Iron & Steel Co. v. Hunt, 192 Ill. App. 215, 219 (1915).
25. Id. at 221.
26. Ibid.
27. In the case of Albin v. Illinois Crop Improvement Ass'n, 30 Ill. App. 2d 283, 174
N.E.2d 697 (1961), the plaintiff had bought seed from Pell-Bari Farms, Inc. (now dis-
solved) in a bag with defendant's tag on it which stated "Certified Seed" and bore a
description of the seed. The seed did not meet the standard stated on the tag and the
plaintiff had a low crop yield. The court said, "It is apparent from the record that the
complaint is based upon the misrepresentation arising from a so-called 'warranty,' and
that the action is in the nature of a tort action based upon the implied warranty." Id. at
285, 174 N.E.2d at 699. The court ruled that in the absence of privity, the action would
not lie.
28. Gordon v. Livingston, 12 Mo. App. 267 (1882).
29. The grain inspector was not a public official.
30. 263 App. Div. 396, 33 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1942). This case has received no major
comment and has not been cited by any other court.
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defective machinery to the plaintiff. Prior to purchase, the plaintiff had
employed Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company
(hereinafter called the Inspection Company) to examine the machinery.
It was approved by the Inspection Company while still in the possession of
a third party. The defendant's purchase for resale to plaintiff was made in
reliance on the inspection report. When the plaintiff sued the defendant on
the contract for damages, the question arose whether defendant could im-
plead the Inspection Company as a party defendant."' The appellate court
allowed the Inspection Company to be impleaded, stating that it would be
liable to the defendant (Electric Company) for damages upon a verdict for
the plaintiff. It was reasoned that "while the contract for inspection was
made between the plaintiff, Laundry Company, and the appellant, Inspec-
tion Company, the latter would be liable to the Electric Company which
had relied upon the Inspection Company's representations."32 The rule of
this case is diametrically opposed to that enunciated by the Hunt case. In
New York, at least, a testing company may be liable to third parties.3"
Hunt, however, is still the leading case in this area, and it imposes the
privity requirement upon the liability of testing companies.
IV. ANALOGOUS SITUATIONS
Because few cases have considered the liability of testing companies to
third parties, it is necessary to examine the duty concept in related areas of
business to see what factors are used to limit liability.
A. Bank and Trust Company Cases
Two recent decisions have gone far to break down the rule of no privity-
no duty. 4 In the Missouri case of Motley v. Mercantile Trust Co., Division
No. 1 of the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the plaintiffs had stated
a cause of action in their petition and that the case should be allowed to go
31. Id. at 397, 33 N.Y.S.2d at 926. The lower court had allowed the Inspection Com-
pany to be impleaded, and the Inspection Company appealed.
32. Id. at 398, 33 N.Y.S.2d at 927. (Emphasis added.)
33. The Du Rite case never came to trial on the merits. After the court ruled that
the liability of Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company was a fact
question for the jury, the case was settled out of court for a "nominal amount." Letter
from Carter and Conboy, attorneys for Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance
Company, to author, March 13, 1963, on file in Washington University Law Quarterly
office.
34. Motley v. Mercantile Trust Co., No. 49879 (Division No. 1 of the Supreme Court
of Mo. 1963). (The case was transferred to the Court en Banc where, pursuant to
stipulation, the opinion of Division No. 1 was vacated and the judgment of the trial court
was aff'd.) Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Corp., 9 Utah 2d 215, 341 P.2d
944 (1959).
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to trial."5 Since the lower court had dismissed the case on the pleading for
not stating a cause of action, the "facts" can only be derived from the
plaintiffs' petition. In 1952 Alvina Frech came to defendant, who already
controlled a large part of her estate in an inter vivos trust, and requested
that a will be prepared. The defendant then either "prepared or procured
the preparation of a will for her"3 and such will was executed in July of
1952. The trust property was to pass, in large part, to persons other than
those named in the will and the petition goes on to allege that defendant
knew or should have known of this and should have advised Frech of these
facts. Frech died in 1958 and the petition stated that because of defendant's
negligence, there were no funds to pass to the plaintiffs under the terms of
the will.
The obvious problem in the case is the lack of privity between the plain-
tiffs and the defendant. The Missouri court reviewed the decisions both of
Missouri and of other states that rejected recovery in such a situation. Two
principal reasons for such a result were given. First that if such a suit were
allowed, excessive liability would result, and second that the right to con-
tract would be restricted if it were burdened with obligations and liabilities
that the parties had not contracted to undertake."' However, the court
went on to point out that, "The privity rule has not been followed blindly
and slavishly." '
Earlier Missouri decisions were distinguished on the basis that in those
cases there was unlimited liability, but in this case the potential liability was
limited to the beneficiaries named in the will." It was chiefly because of this
fact that the court was able to overcome the privity problem. The defendant
argued that liability would be unlimited, saying that under a decision of this
type an attorney or trust company might be liable to beneficiaries for any
negligent advice that later reduced the client's estate. The court answered
that the charge was not only giving negligent advice but also "failure 'to take
the action necessary to accomplish her wishes and desires.' ,,40
But the conclusive answer to the fears of the trust company is that a
determination that the alleged facts make a case of liability against
this trust company under these particular circumstances does not con-
stitute a universal rule opening up unlimited liability in all kinds of
cases involving the giving of opinions and advice in matters of business.
35. Motley v. Mercantile Trust Co., supra note 34 at 17.
36. Id. at 2.
37. Id. at 4.
38. Ibid.
39. Id. at 6.
40. Id. at 7.
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Liability would depend upon circumstances and would be circum-
scribed within carefully defined limits.4
After disposing of the second reason for restricting liability, the court
stated:
Since neither of the conventional supporting reasons exist, we have
considered whether there are any other as yet unsuggested reasons why
a contractual connection between these prospective beneficiaries and
this trust company must be found before the latter may be held liable
for its negligence. As a matter of logic and reason we are unable to
perceive why any such nexus should be required, unless it be that the
rule of privity is an ancient one. "It is revolting to have no better
reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was
laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from
blind imitation of the past." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv.
Law Review 457, 469.42
The court held that a duty arose to the plaintiffs that the trust company
exercise ordinary care in advising Frech as to the necessity of revoking or
modifying the trust. The privity requirement was broken here in an
economic loss case, but the court did rule, in effect, that each future case
would have to be decided on its own facts.
A similar result was reached in another case holding a bank liable to third
parties with whom it was not in privity of contract." However, earlier cases
from other jurisdictions have reached an opposite result in the absence of a
contract because of the supposed lack of duty."'
Thus it would appear that the "no duty to third parties" rule is breaking
down in the case of banks, and that the reasoning of the modern cases
might be applied to other situations in the future.
B. Abstracter Cases45
The problem typically arises when a vendor of land applies to an abstract
company for an abstract on the property. The abstracter checks the land
records, but one or more flaws appearing on the record are negligently
overlooked. A title abstract is prepared and presented to the vendee, who
customarily insists on seeing it before the closing. In reliance on the ab-
41. Ibid.
42. Id. at 10.
43. Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Corp., 9 Utah 2d 215, 341 P.2d 944
(1959).
44. Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 245 N.Y. 377, 157
N.E. 272 (1927); Cohen v. Tradesmen's Natl Bank, 262 Pa. 76, 105 Ati. 43 (1918).
45. See Roady, Professional Liability of Abstracters, 12 VAND. L. Rxv. 783 (1959).
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stract, the vendee completes the transaction. Subsequently the vendee must
satisfy a claim negligently overlooked by the abstracter. The vendee then
sues the abstracter for his negligence.
The problem of lack of privity faces the vendee in his suit. When the
abstracter has no knowledge that the certificate will be used by a third party,
courts hold that lack of privity between the vendee and the abstracter bars
recovery and that the abstracter's duty does not extend to unknown third
parties.46
National Say. Bank v. Ward"7 is the leading case in this area. Defendant
was hired to examine a title and the plaintiff, a third party to this contract,
was financially injured by relying on the negligently prepared title. The
Court said:
[T]he difficulty in the way of the plaintiffs is that they never employed
the defendant to search the records, examine the title, or make the re-
port, and it clearly appears that he never performed any such service
at their request or in their behalf, and that they never paid him any-
thing for the service he did perform in respect to that transaction; nor
is there any evidence tending to show any privity of contract between
them and the defendant .... 48
This is typical of cases in which the abstracter has no knowledge how the
certificate will be used. However, Mr. Chief Justice Waite, joined by Mr.
Justice Swayne and Mr. Justice Bradley, dissented and said:
[If an abstracter] ... gives his client a certificate which he knows or
ought to know is to be used by the client in some business transaction
with another person as evidence of the facts certified to, he is liable to
such other person relying on his certificate for any loss resulting from
his failure to find on record a conveyance affecting the title, which, by
the use of ordinary professional care and skill, he might have found.'"
46. National Say. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1880); Abstract & Title Guar. Co. v.
Kigin, 21 Ala. 397, 108 So. 626 (1926); Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Continental Oil
Co., 43 Ariz. 219, 29 P.2d 1065 (1934); Talpey v. Wright, 61 Ark. 275, 32 S.W. 1072
(1895); Hawkins v. Oakland Title Ins. and Guar. Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 116, 331 P.2d
742 (1958); Ohmart v. Citizens' Say. & Trust Co., 82 Ind. App. 219, 145 N.E. 577
(1924); Day v. Reynolds, 23 Hun. 131 (N.Y. 1880); Thomas v. Guarantee Title & Trust
Co., 81 Ohio St. 432, 91 N.E. 183 (1910); Equitable Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Bank of
Commerce & Trust Co., 118 Tenn. 678, 102 S.W. 901 (1907); Peterson v. Gales, 191
Wis. 137, 210 N.W. 407 (1926). In the case of Talpey v. Wright, supra., the landowner
had the abstract prepared so that he could obtain a mortgage on his property. It was
held that the assignee of the mortgage could not maintain a suit against the abstracter
because the abstracter did not prepare the abstract for the use or benefit of the assignee.
47. National Say. Bank v. Ward, supra note 46.
48. Id. at 205.
49. Id. at 207. (Emphasis added.)
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The dissenters would extend liability to third parties when the abstracter
"ought to know." It is evident that when an owner of land asks for an
abstract, the abstracter should realize that more than curiosity prompted the
landowner's request. A third party to whom an abstract is shown should
not be considered too remote to relieve the abstracter of his duty of due
care. This is true for two reasons. First, the abstracter ought to know that
others will rely, and second, since the class is limited to future buyers of that
particular land, the abstracter will not be liable to the general public for any
mistake he might make. The dissenters' logic has equal application to testing
companies, who should know, as well as abstracters, that their opinions will
be relied on by third parties. 0
Where an abstracter has knowledge a third party will rely on the abstract,
or actually delivers the abstract to a third party, he has been held liable for
his negligence in a majority of states.5 In Brown v. Sims, for instance, the
court said, "If the abstracter in all cases be responsible only to the person
under whose employment he performs the service, it is manifest that the
loss occasioned thereby must in many cases, if not in most cases, be remedi-
less." 52 Though the point has not been considered in Missouri, dictum indi-
cates liability will be denied "even where the abstracter or examiner has
knowledge that the certificate as to title is to be used in a sale or loan to
advise the purchaser or loaner."55
Applying the majority rule of the abstracter-with-knowledge cases to the
testing company cases, there would have been liability in the Hunt case
upon a showing that Hunt knew National Iron & Steel Company would
rely on his certification. At least this one branch of the abstracter cases
50. In 1958, a California case pointed out, however, that even if it was known to the
abstract company that it was the custom for third parties to rely on such abstracts, the
abstract company would still not be liable. Hawkins v. Oakland Title Ins. & Guar. Co.,
165 Cal. App. 2d 116, 331 P.2d 742 (1958).
51. Shine v. Nash Abstract & Inv. Co., 217 Ala. 498, 177 So. 47 (1928); Brown v.
Sims, 22 Ind. App. 317, 53 N.E. 779 (1899); Western Loan Sav. Co. v. Silver Bow
Abstract Co., 31 Mont. 448, 78 Pac. 774 (1904); Economy Bldg. & Loan Co. v. West
Jersey Title & Guar. Co., 64 N.J.L. 27, 44 Afd. 854 (1899); Dickel v. Nashville Abstract
Co., 89 Tenn. 431, 14 S.W. 896 (1890); Anderson v. Spriestersbach, 69 Wash. 393, 125
Pac. 166 (1912).
52. 22 Ind. App. 317, 325, 51 N.E. 779, 781 (1899).
53. Zweigardt v. Birdseye, 57 Mo. App. 462, 467 (1894). The abstracter, in this case,
had no knowledge that the third party would rely.
54. As to the issue of knowledge in the Hunt case, the appellate court said, "Plaintiff
relied upon such certificates in making the particular purchase in question, which was
known to defendants." National Iron & Steel Co. v. Hunt, 192 Ill. App. 215, 221 (1915).
(Emphasis added.) However, the supreme court said, "Plaintiffs in error [Hunt] did not
deliver a certificate of inspection to defendant in error [National Iron & Steel Co.], nor
were they advised by defendant in error that it was going to rely upon their inspection."
National Iron & Steel Co. v. Hunt, 312 Ill. 245, 249-50, 143 N.E. 833, 834 (1924).
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and the dissent in Ward form authority for a third party to maintain a suit
against a testing company where the testing company either knows or should
know that the third party will rely on its certificate.
C. Dangerous Object Cases
The leading case holding an elevator repair and inspection company
liable to a third party is Dahms v. General Elevator Co." The court recog-
nized that the repair and inspection company was not an insurer, but said
that the company should have realized that if the repair and inspection
work was done negligently, third parties would be exposed to danger."0
Even though the contract runs between the repair company and the build-
ing owner, the repair company owes a duty of due care to third parties
regardless of privity. Liability has been found in numerous cases."7 One
principal feature of these cases is that elevators are inherently dangerous
if negligently serviced" and it has been said:
[I]t is the law which imposes the duty because of the nature of the
undertaking in the contract. If a person undertakes by contract to
make periodic examinations and inspections of equipment, such as
elevators, he should reasonably foresee that a normal and natural result
of his failure to properly perform such undertaking might result in
injury not only to the owner of the equipment but also to third
parties .... 59
An analogy to profit-making testing companies can be drawn because
often the products tested are inherently dangerous. An example of this is
the following case involving a refrigeration repair company. The plaintiff
was injured by sulphur dioxide fumes escaping from an icebox in her
apartment that should have been repaired by the defendant under a con-
tract with the apartment owner.6" After pointing out that negligent conduct
55. 214 Cal. 733, 7 P.2d 1013 (1932).
56. Ibid.
57. Dickerson v. Shepard Warner Elevator Co., 287 F.2d 255 (6th Cir. 1961); Wes-
tinghouse Elec. Elevator Co. v. Hatcher, 133 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1943); Cowlcs v. Inde-
pendent Elevator Co., 22 Cal. App. 2d 109, 70 P.2d 711 (1937); Higgins v. Otis Ele-
vator Co., 69 Ga. App. 584, 26 S.E.2d 380 (1943); Banaghan v. Dewey, 340 Mass. 73,
162 N.E.2d 807 (1959); Wolfmeyer v. Otis Elevator Co., 262 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. 1953);
Durham v. Warner Elevator Mfg. Co., 166 Ohio St. 31, 139 N.E.2d 10 (1956); Evans
v. Otis Elevator Co., 403 Pa. 13, 168 A.2d 573 (1961).
58. Dahns v. General Elevator Co., 214 Cal. 733, 7 P.2d 1013 (1932).
59. Evans v. Otis Elevator Co., 403 Pa. 13, 18, 168 A.2d 573, 575-76 (1961). See
also Banaghan v. Dewey, 340 Mass. 73, 162 N.E.2d 807 (1959).
60. Rosenbaum v. Branster Realty Corp., 276 App. Div. 167, 93 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1949).
The plaintiff's suit was based on breach of contract and not on negligence as it should
have been and hence the plaintiff lost.
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only becomes actionable where there is a duty, the court said, "The duty of
reasonable care in the performance of a contract is not always owed solely
to the person with whom the contract is made or those claiming through
him, it may inure to the benefit of others."' If this reasoning were applied,
it would be more difficult for testing companies to escape liability for negli-
gent endorsements of inherently dangerous products.
D. Notary Public Cases
When a person claiming to be "John Doe" appears before a notary to
acknowledge the execution of a legal instrument, the notary is under a duty
to find out if he is that person. If the notary negligently certifies the instru-
ment with respect to "Doe's" identity and the same "John Doe" subse-
quently negotiates a business transaction with an innocent party who relies
on the certification, the majority of states allow the third party to recover
from the notary." A notary is not absolutely liable in the absence of negli-
gence,63 but only "if he neglects to exercise such care as reasonably prudent
and competent notaries would exercise in taking and certifying acknowledg-
ments." 6'
It is difficult to draw an analogy between notaries and testing companies
because notaries are "quasi-public officials." Nevertheless a majority of
states extend the duty concept to them because the public is entitled to rely
on their acts. As previously noted, the public relies on testing companies
for a great deal of information on which to base purchasing decisions. It is
clear that the same type of public reliance is placed on testing companies as
is placed on notaries.
61. Id. at 168, 93 N.Y.S.2d at 212 (dictum).
62. Bellport v. Harkins, 104 Kan. 543, 180 Pac. 220 (1919); Commonwealth ex rel.
Green v. Johnson, 123 Ky. 437, 96 S.W. 801 (1906); Barnard v. Schuler, 100 Minn.
289, 110 N.W. 966 (1907); State ex rel. Park Nat'l Bank v. Globe Indem. Co., 332 Mo.
1089, 61 S.W.2d 733 (1933); Harrington v. Vogle, 103 Neb. 677, 173 N.W. 699 (1919);
Peterson v. Mahon, 27 N.D. 92, 145 N.W. 596 (1914); Clapp v. Miller, 56 Okla. 29,
156 Pac. 210 (1916); Figuers v. Fly, 137 Tenn. 358, 193 S.W. 117 (1917); Lee James,
Inc. v. Cart, 170 Wash. 29, 14 P.2d 1113 (1932). Contra, New England Bond & Mort-
gage Co. v. Brock, 270 Mass. 107, 169 N.E. 803 (1930). The fact that "John Doe" has
usually disappeared by the time the forgery is discovered has influenced this rule. It is
pointed out that the acts of a notary public are ministerial and not judicial. Common-
wealth ex rel. Green v. Johnson, supra. "If they acted in a judicial capacity, of course,
they would not be responsible for mere error of judgment, but acting in a ministerial
capacity, they are responsible for their errors unless they can show that they occurred
notwithstanding the use of reasonable care and diligence on their part to prevent same."
Id. at 441, 96 S.W. at 802.
63. Barnard v. Schuler, supra note 62, at 292, 110 N.W. at 967.
64. Ibid.
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E. Accounting Firm Cases
Accounting is another area in which there is third party reliance. An
accounting firm audits the books of a corporation and a financial report
based on this audit is issued. Third parties often rely on this report in
making investment decisions. It has been held that a third party has no
action against the accounting firm for mere negligence."5 In Landell v.
Lybrand, the court said that since the plaintiff had no contract with the
defendant, he was a stranger to the transaction and hence not the recipient
of a duty.66 In the famous Ultramares case, Judge Cardozo pointed out that
the accounting service rendered was primarily for the benefit of the other
party to the contract and only incidentally for the use of others. 7 The
cases of Glanzer v. Shepard8 and International Prods. Co. v. Erie R.R. 0
were distinguished on the ground that so revolutionary a change in the law
as to hold accounting firms liable for mere negligence should be made by
the legislature."0 It was said, however, that if the negligence of the de-
fendants was gross, fraud could be inferred. 1
The accounting cases may be distinguished from the testing company
cases by applying the Ultramares test of for whom the service is primarily
rendered. Although manufacturers do use the information obtained from
independent testing companies to improve their products, this information
is used primarily to influence customers. But the Ultramares doctrine deny-
ing liability because of possible unlimited liability to the public (anyone who
might see the report) may prove to be an escape avenue for testing com-
panies since the class of buyers of the products they test is usually unlimited.
F. Attorney Cases
Attorneys are not generally liable to third parties for negligent professional
acts."' The courts indicate that if an attorney could be held liable to third
65. O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 758
(1937); State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938); Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931); Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen,
131 N.Y.S.2d 20 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd mem., 285 App. Div. 867, 137 N.Y.S.2d 829
(1955); Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 At. 783 (1919).
66. Landell v. Lybrand, supra note 65.
67. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). See also text
accompanying note 1 supra concerning unlimited liability.
68. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922). See text accompanying notes 82-85 infra.
69. 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662, cert. denied, 275 U.S. 527 (1927).
70. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
71. Ibid.
72. Dundee Mortgage & Trust Inv. Co. v. Hughes, 20 Fed. 39 (9th Cir. 1884);
Lackey v. Vickery, 57 F. Supp. 791 (W.D. Mo. 1944); Dallas v. Fassnacht, 42 N.Y.S.2d
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parties for every possible error, "the practice of law [would be] one of such
financial hazard that few men would care to incur the risk of its practice.1
7 3
This statement is perhaps too extreme since the practicing attorney is al-
ready under a "duty to use care and skill and to display a requisite legal
knowledge."" Therefore, it might be possible to extend the burden of due
care to third parties and have more than a "few men" remain in the legal
profession. 5
Two recent California cases, however, have cast doubt on the present
rule." In Biakanja v. Irving," decided in 1958, the defendant, a layman,
negligently drafted a will for the plaintiff's brother. The will, defective for
want of attestation, was rejected by the court, and the plaintiff received a
smaller intestate share than he would have taken under the will. The court
held that the defendant was liable for any negligently caused injury sus-
tained by plaintiff even though they were not in privity. It was stated that:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be
held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and
involves the balancing of various factors, among which are the extent
415 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (dictum); In re Cushman, 95 Misc. 9, 160 N.Y.S. 661 (Surr. Ct.
1916); Rose v. Davis, 288 Ky. 674, 157 S.W.2d 284 (1941). The rule is often stated
that, "It is only in exceptional cases where attorneys are liable to third parties for their
professional acts.... [A]n attorney is liable to a third party 'where the attorney has been
guilty of fraud or collusion, or of a malicious or tortious act ... .'" Lackey v. Vickery,
supra at 792.
73. Rose v. Davis, 288 Ky. 674, 676, 157 S.W.2d 284, 285 (1941).
74. Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. Rav. 755, 757
(1959).
75. This assumes, of course, that courts would limit liability at some point (not allow
liability to an unlimited class), but that this point would be far enough "down the chain"
so as to allow third parties whom the transaction affected to recover for negligence. A
good example of this problem appears in Howell v. Betts, 362 S.W.2d 924 (Tenn. 1962).
The plaintiffs purchased land relying on a survey that the defendants had made for a
former owner over 24 years before. The survey was inaccurate and the lot the plaintiffs
purchased was less in area than was shown in the survey. The court pointed out that the
old rule of no privity-no duty was quickly breaking down, citing such cases as Biakanja
v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (see text accompanying notes 76-78 infra)
and Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) (see text accompanying
notes 83-86 infra). However, the court went on to say that:
On principle and authority, we think the rule of liability cannot be extended
to a case like that before us. If these surveyors could be held liable to such an
unforseeable [sic] and remote purchaser 24 years after the survey, they might, with
equal reason, be held liable to any and all purchasers to the end of time. We think
no duty so broad and no liability so limitless should be imposed. Id. at 926.
Limiting factors of time and class were used to allow defendant to escape liability.
76. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
77. Biakanja v. Irving, supra note 76.
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to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foresee-
ability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct
and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's
conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm."'
This same reasoning was applied by the California courts in 1961 in Lucas
v. Hamm,"9 which decided that lack of privity did not bar beneficiaries from
maintaining an action against an attorney for negligently preparing a will.
If the reasoning in Biakanja and Lucas finds additional support,0 it
could serve as a foundation upon which the Hunt rule could be overturned
and a duty of due care placed on testing companies in the absence of privity.
G. Public Inspector Cases
In the case of Nickerson v. Thompson,"' the defendant, a public inspector
of fish, certified their quality. The plaintiff purchased the fish and suffered
economic loss because of reliance upon the inspection when the fish proved
to be of a poor quality. The defendant was held liable for his negligent
certification. Other cases have reached a similar result.8 2 They are distin-
guishable from the testing company cases, however, because the defendant in
each case was a "public inspector"-govermnment inspector-and hence
liable to all persons injured as a result of his negligence.
In Glanzer v. Shepard,3 a seller of beans requested the defendant, a
public weigher, to weigh a certain shipment of beans and send a copy of
the report to the plaintiff buyer. The defendant did so, but negligently
over-weighed the beans. The plaintiff then purchased the beans in reliance
78. Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19. It was suggested that this case did not lay the founda-
tion for liability of attorneys to third parties (since the defendant was not an attorney).
14 U. MAmi L. Rlv. 124 (1959). Contra, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 330 (1958). However the
court held that the case of Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900 (1895), is "dis-
approved in so far as ... [it is] in conflict with this decision." Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.
2d 647, 651, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958). The Buckley case had been accepted as California
law until 1958; in it an attorney was exonerated from liability to a third party because
of lack of privity.
79. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. dented, 368 U.S.
987 (1962). In this case, however, the court ruled that the attorney was not negligent.
80. But see Maneri v. Amodeo, 38 Misc. 2d 190, 238 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
Plaintiffs sued an attorney who had negligently prepared a will for their deceased mother.
The court rejected the theory of the Biakanja and Lucas cases, stating that an attorney
would not be held liable for mere negligence to a third party with whom he has no privity.
81. 33 Me. 433 (1851).
82. Tardos v. Bozant, 1 La. Ann. 199 (1846) (pork inspector); Pearson v. Purkett,
32 Mass. 264 (1834) (fish inspector).
83. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
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on the report. Judge Cardozo, affining a judgment for the plaintiff, said,
"One who follows a common calling may come under a duty to another
whom he serves, though a third may give the order or make the payment. 8 4
The judge then said that it is the law which imposed a duty8 and that "we
do not need to state the duty in terms of contract or privity.""8 This state-
ment is salient for it illustrates the trend toward eliminating the privity
requirement. It is important to note in this case that there was a limited
class (the plaintiff) relying on the report.
H. Miscellaneous Third Party Reliance Cases
In one third party case a trustee of bonds certified their security knowing
that the plaintiff would rely on such information. 7 The defendant was held
liable for his negligent certification because he knew that plaintiff would
rely. There are similar holdings on various fact patterns.88
84. Id. at 239, 135 N.E. at 276. A "common calling" is difficult to define. Here the
defendant, a "public weigher," engaged in a private profit-making business, and was not
a government officer.
85. Id. at 238, 135 N.E. at 275.
86. Id. at 239, 135 N.E. at 276.
87. Doyle v. Chatham and Phenix Nat'l Bank, 253 N.Y. 369, 171 N.E. 574 (1930).
88. Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 204 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1962)
(see note 14 supra) ; Mulroy v. Wright, 185 Minn. 84, 240 N.W. 116 (1931); Pilinko v.
Merlau, 10 Misc. 2d 63, 171 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 7
App. Div. 2d 617, 179 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1958). In Mulroy v. Wright, supra, a clerk issued
a certificate showing that there were no special assessments on a certain piece of property.
The plaintiff, a third party, bought the property in reliance on the certificate. The clerk
had no knowledge that this plaintiff would rely, but the court held him liable, saying
"defendant, in making this certificate, knew that someone was expected to rely thereon."
Id. at 86, 240 N.W. at 117. Here again there was a limited class to whom the defendant
might be held liable.
In Pilinko, supra, defendant insurance company, undertook to inspect its client's prop-
erty. The inspection was done negligently. The plaintiff, client's tenant, was injured
because of a defect that the inspection should have uncovered. The court held the de-
fendant liable without a privity relation existing, stating that once the defendant was
under a contractual obligation to the client, the defendant owed a duty of due care to
the plaintiff.
Contra, Bilich v. Barnett, 103 Cal. App. 2d 921, 229 P.2d 492 (1951); Jaillet v. Cash-
man, 115 Misc. 383, 189 N.Y.S. 743 (Sup. Ct. 1921), aff'd per curiam, 235 N.Y. 511,
139 N.E. 714 (1923); Howell v. Betts, 362 S.W.2d 924 (Tenn. 1962) (see note 75
supra). In Bilich, supra, the plaintiff was hired to install a sewer for Reliable Trucking
Company. Reliable then hired the defendants to prepare a grade sheet so that the plain-
tiff would know how to lay the pipe. The defendant knew the plaintiff would rely on
the grade sheet. The sheet was negligently prepared and the plaintiff incurred additional
expense because of the mistake. The court ruled that in the absence of privity, no duty
of due care existed. Perhaps Bilich should have been decided the other way on its facts.
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In Kahl v. Love, " defendant tax collector negligently issued a tax receipt
and the plaintiff, a third party, negotiated an ill advised transaction in
reliance on the tax receipt. The court said that there was no duty and the
defendant was not liable. The court summarized the duty problem in an
oft-quoted statement:
It is not every one who suffers a loss from the negligence of another
that can maintain a suit on such ground. The limit of the doctrine
relating to actionable negligence is, that the person occasioning the loss
must owe a duty, arising from contract or otherwise, to the person
sustaining such loss. Such a restriction on the right to sue for a want
of care in the exercise of employment or the transaction of business,
is plainly necessary to restrain the remedy from being pushed to an
impracticable extreme. There would be no bounds to actions and
litigious intricacies, if the ill effects of the negligencies of men could be
followed down the chain of results to the final effect."0
It is difficult to draw from these cases any general rules, but it should
be noted that an important factor in most cases is the size of the class to
which liability will be extended.
I. Express Warranty Cases
A second theory on which testing companies could be held liable to the
public is express warranty."' This theory has been chiefly applied to manu-
facturers. 2 An express warranty theory overcomes the negligence problem
and, in some states, the privity requirement has been eliminated. 3
The leading case on express warranty is Baxter v. Ford Motor Co."'
Defendant's literature stated that its windshield was made of "shatterproof"
glass. The plaintiff purchased a car from a dealer in reliance on this state-
See Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 204 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1962)
(note 14 supra) ; M. Miller Co. v. Dames & Moore, 198 Cal. App. 2d 305, 18 Cal. Rptr.
13 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
In the .aillet case, supra, the defendant furnished information to stock brokers over
his ticker tape. Through negligence, a false report was put out over the tape, and the
plaintiff, who happened to see the report, was injured by relying on it. The court said the
defendant had no contract with the plaintiff and thus no duty relation existed; the de-
fendant was not liable to the general public as this would lead to unlimited liability.
89. 37 N.J.L. 5 (1874).
90. Id. at 8.
91. See generally, Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
92. Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN.
L. REv. 963 (1957).
93. DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUmER 65 (1951).
94. 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932), aff'd, 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934).
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ment and was injured when a pebble shattered the windshield. The court
recognized the general rule that requires privity before suit can be main-
tained for breach of warranty; recovery, however, was allowed because "the
original act of delivering an article is wrong, when, because of the lack of
those qualities which the manufacturer represented it as having, the absence
of which could not be readily detected by the consumer, the article is not
safe for the purposes for which the consumer would ordinarily use it."9
The Baxter case has been followed by other jurisdictions.96 Manufacturers
have similarly been held liable for false statements in their advertising 7 and
on the labels of the goods themselves.9" Since the Baxter case there have
been only a few express warranty decisions imposing the privity require-
ment.9"
For the plaintiff to recover once the privity hurdle is overcome, he must
prove the assertion of an actual fact concerning the particular defect caus-
ing his injury."' The express warranty must be intended for the plaintiff
or the public'.' and must be made by the defendant."0 2 Furthermore, the
plaintiff must learn of the express warranty and be injured by his reliance
upon it.' 3
95. Id. at 462, 12 P.2d at 412.
96. Hansen v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960) (tires);
Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946) (dictum) (rope); Ein v. Good-
year Tire and Rubber Co., 173 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Ind. 1959) (faulty tires); Stude-
baker Corp. v. Nail, 82 Ga. App. 779, 62 S.E.2d 198 (1950) (automobile); Bahman
v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939) (rough seam in auto-
mobile roof).
97. Maecherlein v. Sealy Mattress Co., 145 Cal. App. 2d 275, 302 P.2d 331 (1956)
(mattress spring); Lane v. C. A. Swanson & Sons, 130 Cal. App. 2d 210, 278 P.2d 723
(1955) (boned chicken); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147
N.E.2d 612 (1958) (home permanent); Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106
Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958) (home permanent).
98. Bonker v. Ingersoll Prods. Corp., 132 F. Supp. 5 (D. Mass. 1955) (boned
chicken); Free v. Sluss, 87 Cal. App. 2d 933, 197 P.2d 854 (1948) (soap); Simpson
v. American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940) (insecticide).
99. RachIin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F.2d 597 (2d Cir. 1938); Chanin v.
Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1937).
100. Lambert v. Sistrunk, 58 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1952) (only "sales talk"); Murphy v.
Plymouth Motor Corp., 3 Wash. 2d 180, 100 P.2d 30 (1940).
101. Silverman v. Samuel Mallinger Co., 375 Pa. 422, 100 A.2d 715 (1953); Jeffery
v. Hanson, 39 Wash. 2d 855, 239 P.2d 346 (1952).
102. Senter v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 127 F. Supp. 705 (D. Colo. 1954); Cochran v.
McDonald, 23 Wash. 2d 348, 161 P.2d 305 (1945).
103. Dobbin v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., 25 Wash. 2d 190, 170 P.2d 642 (1946). In
this case the court ruled that the action should be in fraud and not express warranty,
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The logic of applying the express warranty liability criteria to the testing
company cases is clearly illustrated in the following passage from Rogers v.
Toni Home Permanent Co.:
Occasions may arise when it is fitting and wholesome to discard legal
concepts of the past to meet new conditions and practices of our chang-
ing and progressing civilization. Today, many manufacturers of mer-
chandise... make extensive use of newspapers, periodicals, signboards,
radio, and television to advertise their products. The worth, quality
and benefits of these products are described in glowing terms and in
considerable detail, and the appeal is almost universally directed to the
ultimate consumer... . The consuming public ordinarily relies ex-
clusively on the representations of the manufacturer in his advertise-
ments.... The warranties made by the manufacturer in his advertise-
ments and by the labels on his products are inducements to the ultimate
consumers, and the manufacturer ought to be held to strict account-
ability to any consumer who buys the product in reliance on such
representations and later suffers injury because the product proves to
be defective or deleterious. 104
Testing companies also make express statements about the quality of
products, so the courts may find the express warranty reasoning applicable
to testing company cases.
CONCLUSION
There are two theories upon which testing companies may be held liable
to third parties for their statements-negligence or express warranty. Some
courts have been willing to extend the duty concept to third persons regard-
less of privity. It is for the courts to decide if the public is so far "down the
chain" from the testing companies as to be barred from suing for negligence.
In reaching their final determination, the courts, it is submitted, should keep
in mind the reliance placed on testing companies by the general public. The
express warranty theory is still in the process of development. The rule
allowing a suit in express warranty in the absence of privity has been
adopted by many states; thus there is good reason to believe that testing
companies may be held liable on this theory.
It must be realized, however, that excellent reasons exist why a testing
company should not be held liable-chiefly the limiting factors of time"5
and the potential of unlimited liability.' In a majority of instances, testing
apparently misreading the Baxter case where the Washington court had said that an
action for breach of warranty would lie. Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 179 Wash. 123, 35
P.2d 1090 (1934).
104. 167 Ohio St. 244, 248-49, 147 N.E.2d 612, 615-16 (1958).
105. See note 75 supra.
106. See text accompanying notes 34-42 supra.
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companies only test samples of the product involved, and the fault may lie
with the manufacturer. If the testing companies were to be held liable, their
liability would be to an unlimited class of buyers. Thus in certain cases,
these factors should continue to excuse testing companies from liability.
But if testing companies are going to allow their names to be used for
advertising purposes, they should be prepared to accept the consequences.
The testing company's role becomes more important every day in our econ-
omy. Since each consumer cannot hire a testing company, the court should
reconsider the doctrines that immunize these companies from public claims
while permitting them to make such statements as "WE CERTIFY
THAT .... "
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